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P
olicymakers must reexamine the
manner in which corporations and
other organizations that are suspect-
ed of wrongdoing are investigated.  In the
aftermath of the Enron scandal, laws like
Sarbanes-Oxley, combined with recent
changes to the Federal Sentencing Guide-
lines, have substantially increased the penal-
ties on companies and individuals for
white-collar offenses.  The combination of
draconian sentences, lack of meaningful
judicial control over the imposition of sanc-
tions, and the impossible burdens on com-
pany officers have jeopardized the very
nature of our adversary system of justice.
To avoid the potential catastrophe of a
federal indictment, business firms are tak-
ing extraordinary steps to placate federal
prosecutors. And those prosecutors now
regularly insist on the following:
● That business firms surrender or “waive”
their attorney-client privilege,
● That firms must pressure their employ-
ees to waive their constitutional right
against self-incrimination,  
● That firms facing indictment refuse to
advance legal fees to employees under inves-
tigation—even if a firm concludes that an
employee was just following directions or is
otherwise innocent of any wrongdoing, and
● That embattled firms must discharge 
certain employees at the direction of the
government—even if a firm concludes 
that an employee was just following direc-
tions or is otherwise innocent of any wrong-
doing.
Any organization that balks at the gov-
ernment’s demands risks months of nega-
tive publicity as prosecutors characterize 
a legal defense as “impeding” or “obstruct-
ing” the investigation. It is no overstate-
ment to say that the enforcement of the
criminal law, at least insofar as it applies 
to investigations of organizations, often
amounts to a state-sponsored shakedown
scheme in which business firms are extort-
ed to pay penalties that are grossly out of
proportion to any actual misconduct. 
N. Richard Janis is a founding partner of Janis, Schuelke and Wechsler, a Washington, D.C., law firm. 
An earlier version of this article appeared in the Washington Lawyer magazine.
Executive Summary
Introduction
S
ophocles wrote, “There is a point
beyond which even justice
becomes unjust.” Our current
system of justice, at least insofar
as it applies to investigations of
corporations, other organizations, and
their employees has already reached such
a point. Although a few commentators
have addressed the issue, this alarming
development has drawn scant attention in
discussions of legal and public policy, nor
has it been properly addressed by our bar
associations.1 Among experienced white-
collar criminal practitioners, however, it 
is a source of increasing dismay and 
concern. 
This development has been fueled in
large part by the public reaction and polit-
ical response to the most recent wave of
corporate scandals. Our elected represen-
tatives have found that it is good politics
to pander to the public hysteria, and
politicians of both parties have been trip-
ping over themselves to show that they are
tough on corporate crime by increasing
penalties, imposing mandatory mini-
mums, and taking to task executive
branch officials who are not sufficiently
aggressive in the pursuit of corporate
wrongdoers. Largely in response to these
public and political pressures, govern-
ment agencies such as the Securities and
Exchange Commission and the Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services have
been quick to get on the bandwagon and
aggressively exploit the threat of adminis-
trative death penalties—essentially exclud-
ing (or debarring) firms from any contract
work with the federal government—so as
to up the ante for companies under inves-
tigation. The United States Sentencing
Commission has played its part too,
imposing higher and higher penalties on
companies and individuals for white-col-
lar offenses and placing a premium on
“cooperation” as the only way to avoid
otherwise draconian penalties.2
Unfortunately, the Department of
Justice, which has traditionally served as a
restraining force when the pendulum has
swung too far, has itself exercised no
restraint. Don’t get me wrong. I find near-
ly all prosecutors to be generally fair-
minded, conscientious, and frankly easier
to deal with than most civil litigators, who
tend to believe that the more obnoxious
you are, the better the job you are doing.
Moreover, many companies and individu-
als who find themselves in the cross hairs
of prosecutors deserve the attention they
are getting, and prosecutions in many
such instances are fully warranted. Nearly
all federal prosecutors believe strongly
that what they are doing genuinely serves
the public good. But, in a way, that convic-
tion itself can be a problem, since it can
lead to overzealousness and the belief that
the ends justify the means, particularly in
the absence of restraining influences. 
My experience as a former federal pros-
ecutor and a longtime defense attorney
has taught me that if you give anyone,
even a good person, unchecked power, he
or she is going to abuse it. That is what has
happened today. The pendulum has
swung too far. The combination of dra-
conian sentences, lack of meaningful judi-
cial control over the imposition of sanc-
tions, administrative “death penalties”
available to agencies in the form of debar-
ment and exclusion, and the almost
impossible burdens and palpable fears of
company officers and directors created by
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the current
enforcement environment has produced
an inordinate imbalance of power.3 Not
surprisingly, prosecutors have exploited
their virtually unchecked power to extract
and coerce ever greater concessions, jeop-
ardizing the very nature of our adversary
system. It is destruction by accretion—
a staged but seemingly inexorable concen-
tration of power that has skewed the 
system. 
The result has been the emasculation
of the defense bar and the enforcement of
the criminal law in a way that is often
wildly out of proportion to the perceived
wrongdoing. It can be, and often is, a
state-sponsored shakedown scheme in
which corporations are extorted to pay
penalties grossly out of proportion to any
actual misconduct. Criminal sanctions,
administrative sanctions, and director lia-
bility make the payment of tribute to the
federal government essentially a cost of
doing business. In the process, individual
employees, many of whom have faithfully
and loyally served their companies for
years and may well not have engaged 
in wrongful activity, are jettisoned like
detritus and left to their own devices, all 
in the name of “fiduciary responsibility”
and “corporate integrity.” That may
sound like an overstatement, but it is not.
To prove this, let us examine in more
detail how the current system operates
and the implications for our adversary 
system of justice. 
Requiring Cooperation
I
n general, prosecutors couch their
assault on our adversary system of jus-
tice by insisting that they are merely
taking into account an organization’s
“cooperation” with investigators when
they make decisions about whether and
what to prosecute. In 2003 then–deputy
attorney general Larry Thompson prom-
ulgated “a revised set of principles to
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guide Department [of Justice] prosecutors
as they make the decision whether to seek
charges against a business organization.”4
As Thompson made clear, “The main
focus of the revisions is increased empha-
sis on and scrutiny of the authenticity of
the corporation’s cooperation. Too often
business organizations, while purporting
to cooperate with the [federal] investiga-
tion, in fact take steps to impede the
quick and effective exposure of the com-
plete scope of wrongdoing under investi-
gation.” 5
Thus, companies that want to cooper-
ate fully and not “impede” investigations
must adhere to the “General Principle”
articulated by Thompson: “In gauging the
extent of the corporation’s cooperation,
the prosecutor may consider the corpora-
tion’s willingness to identify the culprits
within the corporation, including senior
executives; to make witnesses available; to
disclose the complete results of its internal
investigation; and to waive attorney-client
and work product protection.” 6 
Thompson further asserts, “Another
factor to be weighed by the prosecutor is
whether the corporation appears to be
protecting its culpable employees and
agents. Thus, while cases will differ
depending on the circumstances, a corpo-
ration’s promise of support to culpable
employees and agents, either through the
advancing of attorneys fees, through
retaining the employees without sanction
for their misconduct, or through provid-
ing information to the employees about
the Government’s investigation pursuant
to a joint defense agreement, may be con-
sidered by the prosecutor in weighing the
extent and value of a corporation’s coop-
eration.” 7
Thompson’s immediate successor,
James Comey, proceeded to espouse an
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even stronger approach. In a 2003 inter-
view, Comey said: “In my view, for a corpo-
ration to get credit for cooperation, it
must help the Government catch the
crooks. Sometimes, a corporation can
provide cooperation without waiving any
privileges. Sometimes in order to fully
cooperate and disclose all the facts, a cor-
poration will have to make some waiver
because it gathered the facts through priv-
ileged interviews and the protected work
product of counsel.”8 
If employee interviews are to be shared
with prosecutors, won’t that dissuade many
of them from talking to company attorneys
in the first place?  Comey wasn’t worried; 
the information sharing would have “little
impact” on their willingness to talk to the
company’s attorneys. “In any event,” he
adds, “that possibility does not change the
fact that, in order to fully cooperate, a corpo-
ration has to help the Government solve the
crime.”9 When asked if this might under-
mine a corporation’s relationship of trust
with its employees, Comey said that “good
corporate citizenship” requires nothing less
than full cooperation by employees, con-
cluding (rather simplistically), “Employees
who have only made mistakes will under-
stand; employees who have information
about others will also understand, especially
when the corporation protects them from
retaliation; employees who have committed
crimes, have no trust to undermine.”10
Comey also said, “It is hard for me to
understand why a corporation would ever
enter into a joint defense agreement,
because doing so may prevent it from mak-
ing disclosures it either must make if it is a
regulated industry, or may wish to make to
a prosecutor.”11 Finally, he suggested that a
corporation that does not have a policy of
firing employees who won’t consent to be
interviewed by its counsel is not “acting in
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its shareholders’ interests,” notwithstand-
ing the fact that this may just be “an end run
around the Fifth Amendment,” since “of
course” the government should request the
results of such “interviews conducted under
pain of dismissal.” After all, the government
“needs to find out what happened,” and
“interviews with employees are usually the
source of the corporation’s knowledge.”12 
As if this were not enough, the
November 1, 2004, amendments to the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines effectively
require an organization to waive the attor-
ney–client privilege and attorney work
product protection in order to receive
leniency in sentencing. An amendment to
the commentary to section 8C2.5 adds
the following: “Waiver of attorney-client
privilege and of work product protections
is not a prerequisite to a reduction in cul-
pability score under subdivisions (1) and
(2) of subsection (g) unless such waiver is nec-
essary in order to provide timely and thorough
disclosure of all pertinent information known to
the organization.” 13
The Meaning of 
“Full Cooperation”
I
t is important to note that the govern-
ment has repeatedly redefined what it
means by “full cooperation,” with each
successful demand serving as the new base-
line for what is expected in future cases. As
a result, its demands have become so
extreme that the very existence of the attor-
ney–client privilege and attorney work
product protection have been almost irre-
trievably undermined. As Alice Martin, the
U.S. Attorney in Birmingham, Alabama,
who prosecuted the Health-South Corp-
oration, has observed, “Once one prosecu-
tor has gotten cooperation of a certain
level, that level becomes what we all now
consider cooperation.” 14
Some recent examples are illustrative
of this phenomenon. As reported in the
New York Law Journal in 2004, the Royal
Ahold company avoided Securities and
Exchange Commission sanctions by con-
ducting a comprehensive internal investi-
gation with outside consultants and law
firms, disclosing its problems to the SEC
and federal prosecutors, waiving the
attorney–client privilege and work prod-
uct protection, making employees in the
United States and abroad available for
government interviews, and turning over
to the government the results of its inter-
nal investigations. Thomas Newkirk, an
associate enforcement director of the
SEC, who was involved in the case, noted
that Ahold provided “exemplary coopera-
tion,” and whatever the SEC asked of the
company “they gave and did it as fast as
humanly possible.”15
As reported by the Wall Street Journal,
under pressure from the government
(and no doubt mindful of the govern-
ment’s destruction of Arthur Andersen),
the KPMG firm concluded that “full
cooperation” required it to waive the
attorney–client privilege and work prod-
uct protection; refuse to pay the legal
costs of its partners and employees unless
they agreed to talk to prosecutors; decline
to enter into any joint defense agree-
ments; agree to tell prosecutors which
documents its partners and employees
are requesting to use in their own defense
and to provide prosecutors with copies of
those documents at the same time it pro-
vides them to defense counsel; and refuse
to allow defense attorneys access to the
full set of documents it has provided to
the government.16
By contrast, the SEC settlement with
Lucent Technologies in 2004 included a
$25 million penalty for a supposed lack
of cooperation.17 That lack of coopera-
tion included a statement by Lucent’s
outside counsel during the investigation
denying that Lucent had acted fraudu-
lently, and a reprimand from the SEC for
indemnifying employees under investiga-
tion.18
Faced with such pressures, nearly all
companies today are succumbing to the
government’s escalating demands.
Moreover, in dealing with the logistics of
“cooperation,” companies must rely on
their counsel, who have—in essence—
become deputized by the federal govern-
ment.19 This has promoted disrespect for
the law and for lawyers, who often find
themselves confronted with impossibly
difficult and competing responsibilities
and ethical obligations. Certainly they
must make it clear to employees that they
represent the company and not the indi-
vidual employees to whom they are
speaking. But in their role as deputies for
the Department of Justice, and in order to
serve their client in the name of coopera-
tion, they need to extract as much infor-
mation as possible to curry favor with the
government so that the company can be
seen as “cooperative.”
Nearly all 
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Dealing with Employees
T
his is not intended to denigrate the
honesty or integrity of the corporate
attorneys who are placed in this
position. However, in order to serve their
clients’ interests, corporate attorneys are
under a great deal of pressure to walk a
very fine line when dealing with employ-
ees. Thus, one way of getting employees to
open up is to advise them of their rights,
but to be “economical” with advice that
might “spook” them. Company counsel
are much more likely to emphasize that
they are “just trying to figure out what
happened,” as opposed to telling employ-
ees “you may want to think about getting
your own lawyer.”
Moreover, it has become a regular prac-
tice for company counsel to ensure that
they have interviewed as many witnesses as
possible (and all important witnesses)
before the employees get (or the company
recommends that they get) their own
attorneys. Often the company and its
counsel will demand that an employee
submit to an interview as a condition of
employment (“talk or walk”), even though
the company intends to turn over the
results of the interview to the government.
Essentially, firms are demanding a waiver
of the employee’s Fifth Amendment rights
as a condition of continued employment.
In an interesting contrast, the Supreme
Court has found that the government
itself cannot make such a demand on its
own employees.20 Finally, the company
and its counsel often demand continued
cooperation and even submission by the
employee to government interviews as a
condition of continued employment
and/or indemnification of legal fees. 
Again, to report this state of affairs is
not to denigrate the integrity or profes-
sionalism of the attorneys who represent
companies in these circumstances. To a
large extent, company counsel are simply
playing the hand they’ve been dealt.
Nonetheless, they are being placed in a ten-
uous position by the demands of their
clients on the one hand, and the demands
of the rules of professional conduct on the
other. For instance, Rule 1.13(b) of the
District of Columbia Rules of Professional
Conduct provides, “In dealing with an
organization’s directors, officers, employ-
ees, members, shareholders, or other con-
stituents, a lawyer shall explain the identi-
ty of the client when it is apparent that the
organization’s interests may be adverse to
those of the constituents with whom the
lawyer is dealing.” 21
The District of Columbia Bar Legal
Ethics Committee has opined that disclo-
sure of a potential conflict of interest
must be made whenever there “may be”
adversity between the interests of the cor-
poration and those of employees.
Adversity may be present when “the cor-
poration has not yet irretrievably commit-
ted itself to a position in the matter, but
where one such position might be adverse
to the employee. Such a possible adversity
would almost always arise, then, when the
corporation is able to take a position
adverse to the employee.” 22
Comment 9 to Rule 1.13 provides: 
There are times when the organi-
zation’s interest may be or become
adverse to those of one or more of
its constituents. In such circum-
stances the lawyer should advise
any constituent, whose interest the
lawyer finds adverse to that of the
organization, of the conflict or
potential conflict of interest, that
the lawyer cannot represent such
constituent, and that such person
may wish to obtain independent
representation. Care must be taken
to assure that the individual under-
stands that, when there is such
adversity of interest, the lawyer for
the organization cannot provide
legal representation for that con-
stituent individual, and that discus-
sions between the lawyer for the
organization and the individual
may not be privileged.23
Moreover, as noted in Comment 1 to
Rule 4.3, unrepresented persons inexperi-
enced in legal matters “might assume that
a lawyer will provide disinterested advice
concerning the law even when the lawyer
represents a client. In dealing personally
with any unrepresented third party on
behalf of a lawyer’s client, a lawyer must
take great care not to exploit these
assumptions.” 24 Comment 2 also advises
that “if it becomes apparent that the
unrepresented person misunderstands
the lawyer’s role in the matter, the lawyer
must take whatever reasonable, affirma-
“
”
Essentially, 
firms are 
demanding 
a waiver of the 
employee’s 
Fifth 
Amendment 
rights as a 
condition of 
continued 
employment. 
8
tive steps are necessary to correct the mis-
understanding.” 25
Finally, Rule 4.4 states that “[i]n repre-
senting a client, a lawyer shall not use
means . . . or use methods of obtaining evi-
dence that violate the legal rights of such
a person.” 26 The commentary to the rule
provides in pertinent part that “[r]espon-
sibility to a client requires a lawyer to sub-
ordinate the interests of others to those of
the client, but that responsibility does not
imply that a lawyer may disregard the
rights of third persons.” 27
Slippery Slope
J
ust how slippery this slope can be is
evident when the conduct of company
counsel is viewed from the perspective
of the company’s employees. Any attorney
experienced in these matters knows that
most employees feel they have served the
company loyally and, perhaps increasing-
ly naively, expect the company to recipro-
cate that loyalty. Often the facts regarding
the conduct in question are less an issue
than whether the conduct is criminal;
indeed the conduct under investigation
may even have been standard industry
practice prior to the initiation of the inves-
tigation, or it may present complex
accounting, technical, or legal questions,
and the employee may often have been
acting at the behest of his or her superiors.
Furthermore, in almost every case, the
employees are depending on the company
they have served to indemnify them and
pay for their legal fees—something that
they understandably have come to expect
as a benefit of their employment. This is a
particularly difficult issue, because very
few employees have the resources to
afford competent counsel to represent
them in an ongoing federal criminal inves-
tigation. 
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That the Department of Justice itself
has lost touch with reality concerning
these matters is clearly evidenced by state-
ments attributed to former deputy attor-
ney general Larry Thompson. Thompson
was asked by the Wall Street Journal
whether “given that legal costs can run
hundreds of thousands of dollars, isn’t
the government being unfair to company
employees if it pressures their employers
not to pick up the tab?” 28 According to
the Journal: “Thompson’s response is that
if employees really don’t believe they acted
with criminal intent, ‘they don’t need
fancy legal representation’ to defend
themselves. There are lots of reasonably
priced lawyers, he says.” 29
To employees of a company, then, the
company’s lawyers appear to be acting
duplicitously. They are not trying to pro-
tect the employee, only the company; they
are extracting waivers of constitutional
rights as a condition of employment
and/or as a condition of payment of legal
fees; and they are prejudicing the employ-
ees’ ability to defend themselves and to
protect their families. Under these circum-
stances, the sense of abandonment felt by
employees is palpable and, for attorneys
who have witnessed it firsthand, deeply
disturbing. 
Given the low esteem in which the
legal profession is already held, is it any
wonder that the lesson learned is “don’t
trust the lawyers” and that lawyers repre-
senting companies are held in contempt
by the company’s employees? Moreover,
it is worth noting that this phenomenon
makes it harder for the company to police
itself and promotes disrespect for the
legal profession. 
Department of Justice representatives
often argue against indemnifying employ-
ees by asserting that paying for counsel for
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employees is a “breach of fiduciary duty to
the shareholders” and a “misuse of share-
holders’ assets.” There are at least two
responses to that claim. To begin with, the
department’s sanctimonious expression
of concern about preserving corporate
assets for the shareholders is hard to swal-
low, given the severe financial settlements
consistently coerced by the department
and federal agencies out of companies by
exploiting the double-barreled threats of
prosecution and the imposition of admin-
istrative sanctions, such as debarment or
exclusion. Those settlements, which are
regularly for hundreds of millions of dol-
lars of “shareholders’ assets,” are often
wildly out of proportion to the conduct
alleged, and are often seen by corporate
boards of directors as an exorbitant cost of
doing business, if not outright extortion.
Thus, compared to those sums, the share-
holders’ assets set aside for paying
employees’ legal fees are truly paltry. 
Furthermore, the department’s argu-
ment in this context—and indeed in every
other respect concerning coercion of
employees and waiver of their constitutional
protections in the name of company cooper-
ation—ignores the fundamental concept of
the presumption of innocence. Although
undoubtedly there are some wrongdoers
whose misconduct is painfully evident, life is
rarely that simple. This is particularly true in
the context of white-collar enforcement,
where often the conduct itself may be clear
but its legality (or illegality) is not. 
One is left with the clear impression
that the Department of Justice’s protesta-
tions about a company funding counsel
for its employees has little to do with con-
cern about misuse of shareholders’ assets.
Instead, the department’s concern seems
to be that employees who have capable
defense counsel will be more difficult to
coerce into pleading guilty and “cooperat-
ing.” Indeed, they may actually put the
government to its proof at trial, and force
it to test often dubious theories of crimi-
nal liability that the company itself cannot
risk testing. (Indeed, in rare moments of
candor, a number of federal prosecutors
have conceded as much to me.) 
For example, in 2001 TAP Pharmaceut-
icals pleaded guilty to federal fraud charges
for allegedly paying kickbacks and bribing
doctors for prescribing Lupron, and paid
$885 million to settle criminal and civil
claims. After that settlement, 11 TAP
employees went to trial, arguing that the
activities in question were common indus-
try practices and were not illegal. After a
three-month trial, the district court direct-
ed the acquittal of two defendants, the case
against a third defendant was dismissed by
prosecutors, and the other eight defen-
dants were acquitted of all counts by the
jury.30
In fact, the current system of rewarding
cooperation, with its expected waivers of
attorney–client privilege and attorney work
product protection, coerced waivers of
employees’ Fifth Amendment rights,
forced terminations, limiting or refusing 
to advance legal fees for employees, 
and extraction of draconian penalties (par-
ticularly if the company does not “cooper-
ate”), has created a whole generation of
young prosecutors with no real concep-
tion of, or respect for, the importance of
preserving client confidences and of the
attorney–client privilege. It is not that these
prosecutors are venal; on the contrary, they
genuinely view themselves as serving the
public good. But by embracing an ends-jus-
tify-the-means approach, they have been
trained to view principles and practices
with hundreds of years of acceptance as
nothing but inconvenient nuisances and
roadblocks to the facilitation of their jobs. 
And that mind set has, in turn, led to
another now nearly universal change in our
adversary system of justice: prosecutors
have become lazy, since they have the
means (which they are aggressively exploit-
ing) to have someone else do their jobs for
them. Apparently, it is not enough for pros-
ecutors to have the full weight of the feder-
al government, its investigative agencies,
and the authority of the grand jury with
which to conduct their business. It is easier
to compel companies and their own coun-
sel to become deputized, under the rubric
of cooperation, to do their jobs for them—
conduct the investigation, coerce Fifth
Amendment waivers of the company’s own
employees, waive privilege and work prod- 
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uct, jettison any employees even arguably
involved in the allegedly offending behav-
ior (and decline to pay their legal fees if they
have the temerity to challenge the govern-
ment), and then come back to the govern-
ment, hat in hand, for the government to
proclaim by fiat what price the company
must pay to preserve its existence. 
While Rome Is Burning
G
iven all the tools made available to the
government to effect this total aberra-
tion of our adversary system, as well as
today’s political climate, it is perhaps not
surprising that our bar associations and our
law firms have acceded so meekly. Shame-
fully, bar associations have been fiddling
while Rome is burning. And if the truth be
told, many of our largest and most respected
law firms have come to realize that this new
regime can be, and often is, a new and very
lucrative business opportunity. The govern-
ment now expects companies to, in essence,
deputize law firms and accounting firms to
do the government’s work for them, and
companies now feel compelled to do so as
another cost of doing business and as a pre-
requisite for a grant of government lenity.
Under these circumstances, company
lawyers rarely feel the sort of pressure attor-
neys ordinarily feel when trying to defend a
client. After all, the hardball tactics of federal
prosecutors have fundamentally changed
the nature of corporate counsel’s job––to
investigate to determine if a crime took place
or whether there is a defense. That would be
viewed as “impeding” the government’s
investigation and a lack of cooperation.
Instead company lawyers’ job is to ferret out
any potential misconduct by their own
client (at considerable expense to the client)
and ensure that it is documented and
reported immediately to the government
and that all materials (privileged or not) and
all employees (Fifth Amendment or not) are
provided to the government on a silver plat-
ter.  It is the neutron bombing of the client
that the lawyers have been handsomely paid
to orchestrate. If the government is satisfied,
then the company will be left standing,
although many of its longtime and loyal
employees will be extinguished. 
For hundreds of years, lawyers have been
taught the sanctity and importance of the
attorney–client privilege and the attorney
work product protection as central to our
adversary system of justice. Indeed the exis-
tence of that privilege and that protection
helps to define the role of lawyers in society
and the public’s perception of the fairness
with which the legal system operates. At
least in the context of investigations of
organizations and their employees, all this
is being irreparably destroyed by the gov-
ernment’s successful assault on centuries
of tradition.31
As Justice Wiley B. Rutledge once
warned: “[I]t is from petty tyrannies that
large ones take root and grow. This fact can
be no more plain than when they are
imposed on the most basic rights of all.
Seedlings implanted in that soil grow great
and, growing, break down the foundations
of liberty.” 32
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Notes
1.  See Richard P. Swanson, “Corporate
Investigations and Common Law,” New
York Law Journal 231 (2004): 4; John
Gibeaut, “Junior G-Men: Corporate
Lawyers Worry that They’re Doing the
Government’s Bidding While Doing
Internal Investigations,” American Bar
Association Journal 89 (2003): 46–54. 
Since this article was originally pub-
lished in March 2005, there have been a
number of salutary developments. First,
there has been a great deal of discussion 
of these issues in legal, academic, and 
policy circles, and at symposia sponsored
by bar associations and other organiza-
tions. Second, the American Bar Associa-
tion Presidential Task Force on the
Attorney-Client Privilege has published a
number of reports and recommendations
regarding the attorney-client privilege and
the work product doctrine. The ABA’s
House of Delegates in August 2005 unan-
imously adopted Resolution 111, which
emphasized the importance of the attor-
ney-client privilege and work product doc-
trine in our adversary system of justice
and condemned “the routine practice by
government officials of seeking to obtain
the waiver of the attorney-client privilege
or work product doctrine through the
granting or denial of any benefit or advan-
tage” (see http://www.abanet.org/bus-
law/attorneyclient/materials/hod/recom-
mendation_adopted.pdf). In August 2006
the ABA’s House of Delegates unani-
mously adopted Resolution 302B which
opposed “government policies, practices
and procedures that have the effect of
eroding the constitutional and other legal
rights of current or former employees,
officers, directors or agents (‘Employees’)
by requiring, encouraging or permitting
prosecutors or other enforcement author-
ities to take into consideration . . . in mak-
ing a determination of whether an organ-
ization has been cooperative in the con-
text of a government investigation”
whether the organization advanced or
reimbursed the legal fees of an employee,
entered into or continued to operate
under a joint defense agreement with an
employee, shared its records or other
information relating to an investigation
with an employee, or “chose to retain or
otherwise declined to sanction an employ-
ee who exercised his or her Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimina-
tion in response to a government request
for an interview, testimony, or other infor-
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